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Electric vehicles (EVs) are a viable alternative to internal combustion engine (ICE) vehicles, 
with the potential to alleviate the negative externalities stemming from the present ICE-based 
transportation sector. Notwithstanding, the current prevalence of ICE creates a lock-in state 
that averts the adoption of alternative and environmental friendly technologies, bringing forth 
a social dilemma. Here we investigate the feasibility of escaping the present lock-in state by 
studying possible incentive mechanisms involving, simultaneously, governments (public), 
companies (private) and consumers (civil). Resorting to Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT), 
we develop a theoretical model grounded on the strategic interactions between players from 
the different sectors, whose co-evolving choices influence (and are influenced by) different 
policies and social incentives. Our findings suggest that i) Public regulation is necessary but 
not sufficient for guaranteeing full EV adoption; ii) public-civil synergies are essential; iii) 
demand for EVs preceding supply is most efficient, providing companies with the needed 
incentives to counterweigh infrastructure investments; and iv) full adoption of EVs requires 
coordination between the three sectors to emerge, particularly when changes are initiated by 
the public sector. 
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1. Introduction  
The contemporary means of transportation are mostly based on fossil fuels, thus constituting 
a chief source of air pollution and harmful environmental emissions (Colvile et al. 2001; 
Egbue and Long 2012; Grazi and van den Bergh 2008; Hoen et al. 2014). Changing to less 
polluting energy based transport technologies acquired recently a renewed focus, of which 
the transition from internal combustion engines (ICE) to electric vehicles (EVs) provides a 
paradigmatic example. 
EVs are nowadays perceived as a solution to reduce environmental problems emerging from 
the road transport sector (Thiel et al. 2010). As in the past, the snag is, however, that status 
quo reflects the widespread dominance of ICE vehicles, which poses a coordination dilemma 
to alternative technologies (such as EVs) that remains unsolved to date.  
Originating in the late XIX century, the automobile industry witnessed then a competition 
among several engine alternatives. From steam-powered vehicles to electric and gasoline, all 
were, at some point, a potential dominant technology (Anderson and Anderson 2010). In 
time, the gasoline vehicle prevailed and the industry grew into today’s global scenario. 
The ensuing success of the ICE car surpassed the technological domain and has since then 
reached deep into almost all domains of society. At the forefront of this societal conquest lies 
the continual technological development of the transportation sector (Barret 1996; 
Bruegmann 2006). In time, this self-reinforcing process has led the world, through positive 
feedbacks and path-interdependences (Cowan and Hultén 1996), to a lock-in state where the 
ICE engine constitutes the prevailing technology and any beneficial alternative has proved 
difficult to massively diffuse into the market. This state originated a social trap where 
seeking short-term benefits (e.g. accessibility and avoiding costs of changing the paradigm) 
generate negative collective externalities (e.g. air pollution) that seriously affect long-term 
wellbeing. This scenario, together with problems inherent to the EVs, leads to the following 
6 obstacles, identified as the main impediments to full adoption of EVs (Egbue and Long 
2012; Giffi et al. 2011; USEPA 1996): 1) battery range and degradation, 2) higher purchasing 
costs, 3) limited charging infrastructure and fairly long recharging time, 4) perceived risks, 
5) running costs and 6) the evolution of technology. Battery range and planning of charging 
infrastructures are complex problems still the focus of on-going research (Chen et al. 2016; 
Lee and Han 2017; Montoya et al. 2017; A. Zhang et al. 2017). Besides these barriers, 
adherence to EVs faces yet deeper issues related with individual and social perceptions 
regarding environmental prospects (Lorenzoni et al. 2007). These comprise lack of 
knowledge, uncertainty and skepticism (in technology and scientific outputs), delayed effects 
in time, reluctance to change lifestyles, personal control issues, lack of political action, free-
rider effects, social norms and expectations (Lorenzoni et al. 2007). All together, these 
perceptions create a “behavioral gap” in environmental consumerism that translates into a 
mismatch between pro-environmental attitudes of consumers and their willingness to engage 
in pro-environmental behavior, including buying products and services that minimize the 
impact on the environment (Gifford et al. 2011; Gupta and Ogden 2006; Moons and De 
Pelsmacker 2012; Schuitema et al. 2013; Steg 2005; Wu et al. 2010; J. Zhang et al. 2013).  
These technological and social barriers lead, in fact, to a tragedy of the commons type 
scenario, in which a public good (environmental quality), built upon social cooperation (here 
through EVs adoption), is endangered by the temptation to free ride (individual gain seeking) 
(Hardin 1968; Levin 2000). The complexity inherent to this type of social dilemma usually 
requires multi-level and multi-sectorial responses towards coordination into avoiding the 
non-cooperative state since, at this time, it is not clear whether surpassing technological 
barriers is sufficient to adopt new products, thus attaining new equilibrium states. This is 
particularly relevant given the way that individuals discount the future, being unable to incur 
immediate costs to trigger future benefits (Levin 2012; Van Lange et al. 2013). Several 
forecasting models try to understand and predict the impact of EVs adoption on market shares 
(Glerum et al. 2014; Jensen et al. 2017; Plötz et al. 2014), where it becomes clear the role of 
the above barriers on consumers’ choices. Here we adopt a different approach, including not 
only the behavior of the demand side but also how this behavior might impact, and be 
impacted by, the supply side and the public sector (the ultimate player in promoting policies 
to deal with collective social problems).  
The interrelation between societal sectors that exhibit multiple (and potentially diverging) 
interests produces an incentive landscape that is often challenging to analyze in a systematic 
way, despite its pervasiveness (Encarnação et al. 2016; Santos et al. 2016). Furthermore, 
individual preferences across different sectors are dynamically intertwined, as they are 
influenced by the actions performed, in a given moment, by the representatives of all other 
sectors. This multi-sectorial and frequency dependent nature of incentives, typically 
disregarded in conventional forecasting models, falls naturally in the framework of 
ecological modeling, where situations involving multiple species such as predator-prey 
dynamics or symbiotic interactions are well-known. In this way, the methods used in 
theoretical ecology can be employed to better understand the co-evolution of behaviors in 
socio-economic systems (May et al. 2008; Skyrms 1996) such as the present one underlying 
EVs adoption. Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT) (Hofbauer and Sigmund 1998; Smith 1982; 
Weibull 1995) constitutes, in this context, the mathematical framework of choice that builds 
on the idea of strategic interaction present in classical Game Theory (GT), yet relaxing the 
rationality assumptions often made there. By resorting to EGT, we explore here the 
similarities between the principles that govern strategy adoption and peer-influence in social 
systems and those governing trait evolution through natural selection: successful behaviors 
(similar to genes) spread faster within populations. This is apparent in the case of innovation 
diffusion (Rogers 2003) in which embracing new products is both a combination of 
spontaneous exploration (mutations or adoption by innovators) and success imitation (social 
learning or adoption by imitators). In the specific case of EVs, it is likely that the adoption 
of this technology follows the same principles of multi-sectorial frequency dependence, 
exploration and peer-influence: governmental subsidies, shared infrastructure costs, 
technological investment or environmental activism (to name a few) are mechanisms whose 
implementation depends on the engagement of individuals from particular sectors, and 
which, if effective, may drive the will of other sectors. These feedback loops, in turn, may 
steer early adoption and social contagion processes that – similarly to other technological 
innovations – may determine the disengagement of ICE vehicles and the overall adoption of 
EVs (Mercure et al. 2014).  
Overall, our contribution to transportation research literature is in applying an analytical 
framework, based on a population dynamics EGT model, to explore the possibility of 
escaping the aforementioned lock-in state, where strong interdependencies among, public, 
private and civil players are present. 
 
2. Modelling Framework  
Following (Encarnação et al. 2016), we consider three populations: the public, private and 
civil sectors. The public sector represents government entities, the private sector businesses 
that produce and/or sell vehicles and the civil sector represents consumers.  
Players in each population (public/private/civil) can adopt one of two strategies: To be in 
favor of electric vehicles, labeled as cooperators (C), or maintain the present status quo of 
ICE dominance, labeled as defectors (D). The individual payoff earned in one interaction (or 
encounter) depends on the strategy of each participant in each sector. An encounter occurs 
between three players, each belonging to a different population, and the resultant payoffs are 
arranged in the matrix/table detailed below. The dynamical process of behavior adoption 
assumes that the frequency-dependent fitness (average payoff) of each strategy will 
determine the future adoption of that same strategy, complying with an adaptive scheme akin 
to social learning (Rendell et al. 2010). 
 
2.1. Payoff matrix and parameters  
The individual payoffs and associated parameters are given in Tables 1 and 2, reflecting the 
interdependences within and between populations.  
 
Game parameters Symbol 
Public incentives in the form of subsidies S 
Share of S received by the private sector  
Cost of recharging infrastructures ci 
Share of ci imputed to the public sector  
Coordination benefit of selling/buying a vehicle b 
Increments to EV technology i 
Punishment imposed on the private sector by citizen 
Activism and product boycotting 
Pb 
Punishment imposed on the public sector through 
Citizen activism 
P 
Public-civil synergistic effects 1 
Private-civil synergistic effects 2 
Green taxes over the benefits of private defectors  
Table 1. Game parameters. 
 
Strategies Payoffs accruing to each player 
Public Private Civil Public Private Civil 
C C C 
   
C C D 
 
  
C D C 
   
C D D  
  
D C C    
D C D    
D D C    
D D D    
Table 2. Payoff table, where C indicates a cooperator and D a defector. 
 
The central problem under study is to understand how to solve the social dilemma encoded 
in Table 2, that is, how to promote all sectors to switch to strategy C, corresponding to a 
icS    icbS   1   ibS 1
icS    icS  1 0
ic1 bP   11  bPz
icb   1b b
P icb 2   ibPz  21
0 ic 0
P bP   bPPz 1
0 b b
(future) better environmental quality. As such, the payoff table above must include those 
terms that accrue to processes that occur in a time-scale compatible with the decision-making 
process. Thus, the set of incentives that we consider here and that determine EV or ICE 
adoption – listed in Table 1 and included in Table 2 – interrelate in the following way:  
 When supporting the adoption of EVs, public cooperators provide incentives in the 
form of subsidies (𝑆) shared between private (𝛿 ∈ [0 − 1]) and civil (1 − 𝛿) 
cooperators, following empirical examples where different policy designs exist (Dijk 
et al. 2013; Lévay et al. 2017). Subsidies will incur in a cost to the public sector and 
a benefit to both private and civil sectors. Subsidies can include tax exemptions or 
direct subsidies as a means to improve the cost-competitiveness of EVs, by lowering 
their total cost of ownership (Lévay et al. 2017). On the supply side, subsidies can 
take the form of, for example, R&D grants to support technological innovation 
(EERE 2018; IEA 2018) . 
 EVs require the development of specific recharging infrastructures. It is not clear, at 
present, who should initially pay for this development. Therefore, infrastructure costs 
(𝑐𝑖) can be imputed to both public (𝜌 ∈ [0,1]) and private (1 − 𝜌) cooperators. 
 For simplicity, we assume that the private sector will only sell vehicles when 
encountering a consumer (civil sector) with the same strategy (whether C or D). As 
such, each will receive a benefit (𝑏) for finding a corresponding match in the market 
and selling/buying a car. As such, this benefit will not distinguish between EVs and 
ICEs cars.  
 The model incorporates a positive dependence on technology that mimics increments 
to EV technology (𝑖). Thus, it is assumed that lower technological uncertainty 
translates into increased benefits for civil cooperators when buying an electric 
vehicle, and consequently, improves the feasibility of escaping the lock-in state 
(Berckmans et al. 2017). 
 When private and civil players meet but each adopts a different strategy (C or D), no 
transaction occurs since the type of vehicle for sale does not correspond to the 
preferred type of vehicle to buy, and vice-versa. Thus, neither will receive the 
corresponding benefits. If the civil agent is a defector, and meets a private cooperator, 
his/hers derived payoffs will be null since no transaction occurs and civil defectors, 
as opposed to civil cooperators, do not incur in any activism costs (e.g. punishment 
or boycott) since they do not have to actively seek for the continuity of the status quo 
(i.e. ICE dominance). However, for the private agent these payoffs will include the 
cost of infrastructure development (𝑐𝑖). This burden can be alleviated if, as noted 
above, a public cooperator is present and shares part of these costs (𝜌) and, 
simultaneously, subsidizes the private cooperator.  
 When the strategies adopted are reversed, i.e. a civil cooperator meets a private 
defector, then he/she can resort to boycott (𝑃𝑏), as a form of social punishment to 
private defectors (Franks et al. 2014; Harris and Jung-a 2017) as a way to induce 
change of private manufactures behavior (Kennedy 2017). Boycott is costly to civil 
cooperators but will decrease as the number of civil individuals with the same strategy 
increases (i.e., it will be frequency dependent). As before, the presence of a public 
cooperator can counterbalance these costs since both public and civil cooperators can 
share synergistic effects (∆1). Synergies can be understood as an effort to tackle 
negative externalities (e.g. noise and air pollution) reflecting the alignment between 
the public and the civil sectors. Examples of these synergies are low emission zones 
and congestions charges, such as, for example, those implemented in London, 
Stockholm, Lisbon (CML 2018a; Eliasson 2014; Styrelsen 2018; TFL 2018), velocity 
limits in specific city areas (CML 2018b), emission reduction targets for ICE vehicles 
(Commission 2018), etc. The implementation of the above policy measures target the 
reduction of the negative externalities associated with ICE vehicles thus inducing 
positive synergies for both government and individuals. 
 On the regulation side, when only ICE cars are produced/sold and bought (private and 
civil defectors), public cooperators will try to promote the adoption of EVs through: 
1) the introduction of “green” taxes (𝛾) over the benefit of private defectors and 2) by 
developing the necessary re-charging infrastructure and paying a fraction (𝜌) of the 
corresponding costs (𝑐𝑖). 
 On the other hand, if the public sector adopts the defector strategy, these costs will be 
entirely paid by private cooperators, when encountering a civil cooperator. Private 
cooperators can lessen these costs by 1) collecting the benefit (𝑏) of selling EVs and 
by 2) sharing synergistic effects with civil cooperators (∆2). These synergies can 
include car-sharing schemes, such as Drive Now (DriveNow 2018), marketing for 
target sub-divisions of the consumer market and its social network (Axsen and Kurani 
2012; Roger et al. 2016), free apps of journey assistance to help reduce range anxiety 
(Roger et al. 2016). Simultaneously, these synergies will contribute to the reduction 
of the costs of those civil cooperators engaging in social punishment to the public 
sector (𝑃) – which, as with boycotting, will depend on the frequency of civil 
cooperators. Social punishment can take the form of direct losses in public support to 
government, as for example elections or public protests that can influence public 
policy (Carter and Jacobs 2014; Hobolt and Klemmemsen 2005; Steinhardt and Wu 
2016) or of indirect losses as the spread of negative perceptions on air quality and 
related health risks through media and social media contents (Wang et al. 2015). 
 
2.2. Population dynamics 






= Z . The 
dynamics emerging from the 3-sector interactions are analyzed through an Evolutionary 
Game Theory (EGT) framework, where the adoption of strategies (C or D) within each sector 
follows a fitness dependent birth-death process implemented for 3 finite populations. This 
method mimics the social learning that occurs within human societies whenever successful 
behaviors of role models are widely adopted by other individuals (Rendell et al. 2010). It also 
allows one to model a process of social contagion, especially significant in new technologies 
without a mature market (Jensen et al. 2017). Conveniently, the frequency of each strategy 
(C or D) in the 3 populations defines a possible state of our system, in such a way that all the 
possible states can be represented by means of a cube (Figure 1 below). Each point (x,y,z) of 
that cube matches a state in which a fraction x (y, z) of the individuals of the public (private, 
civil) population cooperate. In this way, the vertexes comprise the configurations where each 
population is either full cooperating (C) or full defecting (D). The fitness (or success) of an 
individual adopting a strategy X within a sector is given by the average return obtained from 
the 3-player game defined by the matrix of Table 2. Each game involves an individual 
randomly selected from each of the 3 populations, leading to an average payoff given by 
f
X
Public(x, y,z) = yzP
XCC
Public + (1- y)zP
XDC
Public + y(1- z)P
XCD
Public + (1- y)(1- z)P
XDD
Public  ,  
fX
Private(x, y,z) = xzPCXC
Private + (1- x)zPDXC
Private + x(1- z)PCXD





Civil (x, y,z) = xyP
CCX
Civil + (1- x)yP
DCX
Civil + x(1- y)P
CDX
Civil + (1- x)(1- y)P
DDX
Civil .  
where f
X
S(x, y,z)conveys the average payoff of an individual from sector S while adopting 
strategy X, provided that the population is currently in the point (x, y, z). P
ABC
S translates the 
payoff obtained by an individual from state S when playing in a group with the strategy 
profile where Public plays A, Private plays B and Civil plays C. These payoffs follow Table 
2. 
As in (Encarnação et al. 2016), we assume two mechanisms of strategy update: imitation and 
mutation. A mutation is said to occur whenever an individual adopts, spontaneously and 
without resorting to any imitation process, a new strategy. Conversely, imitation (or social 
learning) requires 1) the imitated strategy to be already present in the population and 2) a 
fitness value associated with that strategy. Here we adopt the so-called pairwise comparison 
rule (Traulsen et al. 2006), where the successful individuals tend to be imitated more often 
and their strategy spread within each sector. At each time step, a random individual i may 
imitate another individual j randomly selected from the same sector. This imitation occurs 
with a probability p that increases with the fitness difference between the role model j and 













 , where fj and fi are the fitness values of 
individuals i and j, respectively, such that an imitator will have a higher probability of 
imitating a model that reveals a comparatively higher fitness. The parameter β represents the 
“selection pressure” or “intensity of selection”, i.e., the significance of individual fitness in 
the decision to imitate. For β<<1, selection is weak, such that for β=0 the decision to imitate 
is randomly adopted. For large β, imitation becomes increasingly deterministic. As it is often 
the case in natural and human social dynamics (Bell 2010; Sigmund 2010; Traulsen et al. 
2010), here we resort to strong selection (β=1), yet allowing for errors in decision-making, 
potentially induced by confounding factors common to Human decision-making, and that 
often translates into a bounded rational behaviors of players (Gigerenzer and Selten 2002; 
Simon 1987).  
   Our analysis can be considerably simplified whenever we adopt the well-known small 
mutation approximation (Fudenberg and Imhof 2006) adapted for a multi-sector paradigm 
(Encarnação et al. 2016). In this way we reduce the state space under analysis, while still 
keeping vital information regarding the overall dynamics in the full-state space. Technically, 
this corresponds to a maximal reduction of the state space in a hierarchy of approximations 
(Vasconcelos et al. 2017). The intuition behind this approximation can be realized by noticing 
that, under a process of imitation dynamics, only a new mutation can either introduce a new 
strategy or bring back a strategy that has become extinct. If new strategies (i.e., not yet 
existing in the population) are rarely introduced - a situation occurring for low mutation 
probabilities, as detailed above - the population will naturally evolve towards a state where 
all individuals in each sector adopt the same strategy (so-called monomorphic). While a 
monomorphic state will, in this case, always be reached, we do not make any considerations 
regarding the time needed for that to occur.  Thus, when a (rare) mutation occurs, the system 
leaves a monomorphic state, and one out of two scenarios can happen: 1) the mutant strategy 
is successively adopted in the corresponding sector, until a new monomorphic state is reached 
or 2) the mutation is not successful and the system returns to the previous monomorphic state. 
Assuming that mutations are sufficiently rare means that it is reasonable to assume that no 
other mutations – particularly in other sectors – occur until one of these scenarios is verified. 
In this low-mutation regime, the evolutionary process can thus be analyzed by calculating 
the evolutionary dynamics in each sector alone. To this end, we compute the fixation 
probabilities (ρab), that is, the probability that a single mutant with a strategy b (either C or 
D) fully invades a population of Z-1 individuals using the opposite strategy a (Nowak et al. 
2004), 
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where 𝑇𝑗
+(𝑇𝑗
−) represents the probability that one more individual adopts strategy b in a 
population of j individuals already using that strategy b. The 𝑇𝑗
+(𝑇𝑗
−) are calculated assuming 



















The aforementioned transition probabilities (𝑇𝑗
+ and 𝑇𝑗
−), defined for any possible state 
(x,y,z), also allow one to define a gradient of selection (𝑇𝑗
+ − 𝑇𝑗
−) indicating the most 
probable path in state space followed by the three populations, with respect to the adoption 
of strategies. By numerically integrating this gradient for a given initial condition, it is 
possible to follow the average trajectories that reflect the most probable evolutionary path 
(along the full state space) of our 3 populations (Figure 2 and 3 below). Trajectories in state 
space in which the composition of only one population changes are represented by the edges 
of the cube. Along each edge, selection favors the fixation of a C in a population of Ds over 
the fixation of a D in a population of Cs whenever 𝜌𝐶 > 𝜌𝐷. In specific cases, this inequality 
also provides information regarding the eventual risk-dominance of each strategy (Nowak 
2006). 
We also compute the average fraction of time spent in each monomorphic state (the cube 
vertexes in Figures 2 and 3 below). To this end, we calculate the so-called stationary 
distribution (in the small mutation approximation), taking advantage of the Markov nature of 
the process, with transition probabilities given by the aforementioned fixation probabilities 










Whenever, as is the case, the Markov chain is irreducible there is a unique stationary 
distribution calculated as the eigenvector (of matrix T) associated with eigenvalue 1, i.e. 
p *T = p *
 
(Fudenberg and Imhof 2006; Vasconcelos et al. 2017). 
 
3. Results: Paths to the Adoption of Electric Vehicles 
p *
 Let us now analyze how the preferences of each sector co-evolve, which translates into 
different evolutionary trajectories that potentially lead to the overall adoption of EVs. The 
overall dynamics is illustrated in Figure 1, where it is clear that some transitions towards the 
adoption of EVs are likely to be fulfilled. This said, escaping the current lock-in state (in 
which everyone supports ICE, i.e., vertex DDD) requires the intervention of the public sector, 
as both private and civil sectors lack the required incentives to initialize the technological 
transition by themselves (see payoffs for transitions DDD → DCD and DDD → DDC in 
Table 2 above and edges 9 and 5 in Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Three player representation cube (Left). Each edge is accompanied by conditions (orange 
arrows, detailed in the Right panel) that, when verified, imply that the fixation of Cs in a population 
of Ds is higher than the fixation of Ds in a population of Cs. While here we focus on the analytical 
results that describe the transitions between states where only one sector changes its strategy, all other 
possible transitions (including through the interior of the cube) are later explored, in Figures 2 and 3, 
by employing numerical simulations. Note, however, that the above conditions which govern the 
edges of the cube will also influence the dynamics inside the cube. 
 
In fact, by unilaterally promoting EVs adoption, private cooperators would need to deploy 
infrastructure development and pay for this costly enterprise. This extra investment may be 
discouraging (Yang and Holgaard 2012) and in some way expresses the propensity of 
manufacturers to absorb and control change (Wells and Nieuwenhuis 2012). On the other 
hand, by being the only sector to choose EVs, civil cooperators would have to bear the high 
costs of being misaligned with the private sector. Hence, regardless of the initial efforts from 
the private and civil sectors, unlocking state DDD requires intervention from the public 
sector. By, e.g., collecting “green” taxes, public cooperators can gain advantage over public 
defectors when these gains outweigh the cost of unilaterally providing the deployment of the 
necessary recharging infrastructure (edge 10 in Figure 1 and Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2. The evolutionary dynamics under study follows a Markov Process whose transition 
probabilities are pictured in a cube, in which vertices match the considered states (Left panel). The 
transition probabilities are normalized by 1/Z, the neutral drift probability. Only transitions with 
probability higher than 1/Z are represented. The diameter and color of the circles translates the 
fraction of time spent in those same states (provided by the stationary distribution – see section 2.2 
above). The stochastic nature of dynamics suggests that there is not a unique time series 
corresponding to the time evolution of strategy adoption. Thereby, we represent the most probable 
time series, starting from a state in which 10% of each population adopts Cooperation (Right panel). 
Parameters’ values: 𝑆 = 0.0; 𝛿 = 0.5; 𝑐𝑖 = 0.24; 𝜌 = 0; 𝑏 = 0.5; 𝑖 = 0; 𝑃𝑏 = 0.0; 𝑃 = 0.0; ∆1 =
0.0; ∆2 = 0.0; 𝑍𝑐𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑙 = 𝑍𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 = 𝑍𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒 = 𝑍 = 50 ;  𝛾 = 0.54. 
 
 
3.1. Towards a stable state of EV adoption 
Once the public supports EVs, new incentive mechanisms can be implemented in order to 
steer the behavior of the other two sectors. The challenge is now to decide between acting on 
the supply side (private sector) or on the demand side (civil sector). On the supply side, 
subsidies given to private cooperators will have to compensate the benefit of selling ICE 
vehicles and also the costs of infrastructure development (see condition 11 in Figure 1). On 
the demand side (civil sector), the benefit of owing an ICE vehicle must be lower than the 
synergies with the public sector and these should be sufficient to compensate the cost of 
boycotting (condition 6 in Figure 1). 
   In Figure 3, we explore how EV adoption evolves in time, when emphasis is placed on 
these different public incentives. As can be seen in panel A, by first promoting the demand 
side through public-civil synergies (∆1 = 0.51), the world will reach state CCC.  Here, and 
in the absence of subsidies (𝑆 = 0), punishment (𝑃 = 0) and infrastructure costs (𝜌=0), the 
world will drift between states DCC and CCC, since both strategies bring equal payoffs to 
public players. This shows that the public sector can withdraw its direct influence in the game 
when the private and civil sectors reach full adoption of EVs. 
By including subsidies (panel B Figure 3), and equally distribute them between private and 
civil players (𝛿 = 0.5) it is possible to promote overall cooperation in these two populations. 
As subsidies represent a costly endeavor, once private and civil sectors coordinate into EV 
support, it is likely that the public sector retracts from such monetary burden (thus reaching 
state DCC as before). This withdrawal can be prevented if civil cooperators are willing to 
punish public defectors (panel C of Figure 3) or if high levels of public-civil synergies exist. 
In this case, the system will ultimately stabilize in state CCC. The trajectories in Figure 3 
also show that combining different mechanisms (policy instruments) can contribute to speed 
up EV adoption, in accordance with empirical research on environmental policy performance 
(Daugbjerg and Sønderskov 2012) - see also (Encarnação et al. 2016). 
 
 
Figure 3. The evolutionary dynamics under study follows a Markov Process whose transition 
probabilities are pictured in a cube, in which vertices match the considered states (Left panels). The 
transition probabilities are normalized by 1/Z, the neutral drift probability. Only transitions with 
probability higher than 1/Z are represented; transitions with probability higher than 1/Z are said to be 
favored by natural selection. The diameter and color of the different states (circles) represent the 
fraction of time spent in those states. The stochastic nature of the dynamics suggests that there is no 
unique time series corresponding to the time evolution of strategy adoption. Thereby, we represent 
the most probable time series, starting from a state in which 10% of each population adopts a 
Cooperative (EV) strategy (Center panels). Panels A, B and C represent different combinations of 
parameters (see Right panels). As before, we assume Z=50. 
 
In what concerns those parameters not used in Figure 3 (that is, taken to be zero), namely 
civil boycott to private defectors (𝑃𝑏), private-civil synergies (∆2) and technological 
increments to EVs (𝑖), the conditions depicted in Figure 1 above show that:  
 Being costly to civil cooperators, boycott (𝑃𝑏) can be avoided to the extent that public-
civil synergies (∆1) are in place. Examples of such synergies, in addition to the ones 
deemed previously, exist through regulatory standards, operational programs, 
information sharing and support to member activities in collaboration groups (Abbott 
2012). The implicit cost associated with 𝑃𝑏 (e.g. in terms of time, learning and 
information gathering), renders it viable in scenarios where an engaged public sector 
is absent (defection, edges 1 and 8, cf. Figure 1). In these scenarios, private-civil 
synergies (∆2) can also push private and civil sectors into cooperation and can 
compensate the costs accruing to the private sector with infrastructure development 
(𝑐𝑖). 
 Incremental developments in EVs technology (𝑖) will play a role in scenarios where 
the supply side is fostered first (edges 7 and 8, cf. Figure 1), an unlikely scenario in 
face of the results presented in this study. Nevertheless, the importance of this 
parameter becomes clear in shifting from a state where only private companies 
support EVs (vertex DCD, cf. Figure 1). When the benefits of buying EVs and 
private–civil synergies are not sufficient to compensate the costs of punishing, 
incremental development of EV technology can twist the balance and rapidly promote 
increasing numbers of civil cooperators towards the state DCC. This would prevent 
the private sector from changing to defection, thus leading to a demise of overall 
cooperation. 
 
4.  Discussion and  Conclusions 
Transition to EVs is a complex problem that extends beyond the competition between 
alternative technologies. At its core lies a social dilemma of collective action in which social 
benefits stemming from EV usage face the barrier of replacing a consolidated technology 
(ICE). By resorting to evolutionary game theory, we have developed a theoretical model to 
study the interdependences between three sectors of society, seeking to unveil the 
mechanisms that allow one to escape the dilemma and allow society to massively adopt EVs. 
Our findings suggest that the complexity inherent to EV adoption needs a proactive society 
with public support. Governmental regulation is determinant in providing the initial lead-off 
towards the transition to EV. This initial step can be self-enforced, as “green” taxes may 
provide the material incentive to counterbalance the advantage of the already established ICE 
vehicle. Once supporting EV, the public sector can activate mechanisms – such as subsidies 
– that may be used as financial backing of private and civil sectors. Once bootstrapped, the 
next question is whether one should opt between supporting the supply or the demand side. 
Our results show that demand should be the initial target and assured through public-civil 
synergies – a mechanism of paramount importance in our results.  
Public-civil synergies can be understood as a way to increase environmental awareness and 
to raise the level of conformity between public and civil sectors. To guarantee this mutual 
support, some researches show that advertising campaigns on environmental benefits of 
green products can be relevant in changing behaviors (Nyborg et al. 2006). Public advertising 
may also contribute to bridging the gap between consumers intents/concerns and actions 
(Kalamas et al. 2014) which can increase their willingness-to-pay (Plötz et al. 2014) 
additional costs that are perceived as necessary to sustain long term collective gains (such as 
better environmental quality). Simultaneously, a strong and active civil sector (apt to 
influence public policy through synergies) can be more evident if individuals organize in 
social groups such as NGOs. While here we treat the civil sector as individual consumers, 
future work is needed in order to determine the viability of civil collective action and its 
influence on civil-public synergies.  
In summary, our results show that the path to full adoption of EVs should start with public 
intervention, through subsidies, “green” taxes and synergies with the civil sector. The latter 
is determinant not only to foster a necessary demand side for EVs but also to compensate the 
costs of subsidizing both private and civil sectors. A more general interpretation of these 
results may hint on the relevance of these synergies in increasing the environmental 
awareness of the civil sector. A pro-environment and active population can not only express 
dissatisfaction through engagement (when needed) in consumer activism but can also 
contribute to shift valuations over the different products, putting a higher value on 
environmental friendly behavior than on the short-term benefit of owning an ICE vehicle. 
The increase demand for EVs could then pull the supply side towards full adoption of electric 
vehicles. We also highlight that, after the proper coordination of civil and private sectors into 
EV promotion, public intervention can be edged off without reducing the EV adoption levels. 
Finally, the present model highlights the importance of taking into consideration an 
increasingly organized civil society, a new third sector capable of disrupting the previously 
dominant two-player dilemma involving the public and private sectors.  
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